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OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTS WITH
UNOBSERVABLE INVESTMENTS
MARIO TIRELLI∗
Abstract. Motivated by the informational ‘opacity’ that often characterizes small firms,
this article studies a security design problem in which outside investors are unable to
observe entrepreneurs’ investments decisions and their firms’ net-worth, both before and
after contracts are signed. The investment size affects the probability of higher profit
realizations and depends both on the amount of the entrepreneur’s initial capital (or type)
and on the firm’s access to outside funds. The interconnectedness of these three different
forms of asymmetric information implies as many risks in the design problem: a possible
adverse selection on entrepreneurs’ types; moral hazards both on investments and on the
release of information related to the firm’s income/profits. Our approach and model is
an extension of the classical, reduced-form one used in the moral hazard literature. The
results we present establish that outside finance should take the form of a debt contract,
whose terms are: a firm’s capitalization requirement, a fund size, a payment schedule, a
verification/auditing rule. Optimal contracts form a menu; those for higher capitalized
firms are of larger size, carry a lower interest rate and lower expected costs of auditing.
The payment schedule is the one of standard debt contracts; however, due to the role
played by capital, the ‘bankruptcy’ region is narrower than prescribed in previous studies
and decreasing in the firm’s initial net-worth.
(JEL Classification Numbers: D820, D860, G110, G320.)
(Keywords: Security design; asymmetric information; moral hazard; investment decisions;
debt contracts, collateral.)
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1. Introduction
Data show that the contribution of small and medium companies (SMEs) to the European
economy is considerable. Across EU28 in 2015, SMEs accounted for two thirds of the
employment and slightly less than three fifths of the value added in the non-financial business
sector. This relative importance of SMEs extends to all high-income OECD countries, to
most of high-income non-OECD ones, to Est-Asia (particularly to China) and the Pacific
(see Kushnir, Mirmulstain and Ramalho, 2010).
Despite their relevance, SMEs often find themselves at a disadvantage with respect to
large firms in accessing to finance, both in terms of higher costs and lower opportunities;
something that is frequently explained by referring to perhaps the most common of SMEs’
characteristics: ‘informational opacity.’ The ‘opacity’ of small firms and their consequent
difficulties in accessing to finance, are largely associated to three factors (e.g. see the
discussion in Beger and Udell, 1998; and the survey by Abdulsaleh and Worthington, 2013):
a very simplified governance; softer regulatory requirements on accounting and transparency
(information disclosure); a low capitalization.
Indeed, the vast majority of small companies are family owned or are simple partnerships,
characterized by an elementary owner-manager structure. Moreover, especially for young
firms, owners do often use personal assets to either directly finance investments or to access
credit. This makes harder for outside investors to distinguish the financial situation of
a firm from the personal one of its owners. Information acquisition is then worsen by a
consolidated tendency of regulators to reduce the administrative burden for SMEs, which in
many situations translates into weak information requirements, especially on their financial
status.1 Finally, agency costs are exacerbated by a diffused undercapitalization of small
companies, which for technologically oriented firms is worsen by a tendency to invest in
assets that are difficult to evaluate and largely unsuited to be used as collateral: ‘soft’ and
intangible capital.
Motivated by such evidence, in this paper we study the optimal financial structure and
decisions of firms, whose risk-neutral entrepreneurs need to raise outside finance in a context
in which several agency problems combine. In particular, our security design problem
is one in which intermediaries (or outside investors) i) are unable to observe the firms’
initial financial status (or net-worth), ii) neither observe nor can verify how their funds are
invested, iii) can only contract on final returns (firms’ cash flows) that are subject to a
costly verification.
1The requirement of an annual balance sheet and a profit/loss account has been reaffirmed, even recently, in
the EU Responsible Business Package (see European Parliament, Directive 2013/34/EU), also for limited-
liability companies. In addition, depending on their dimension (small or micro firms), the Directive, allows
EU Members to introduce further significative simplifications at national level, especially in terms of a
consistent reduction of financial information. Similarly, in the US, small companies are not required to
release financial information on 10K forms.
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The principal-agent model we propose builds on and extends the classical moral hazard
one due to Innes (1990).2 It follows Innes’ in the timing of the agents’ actions and in some of
the main restrictions on contracts. Instead, it differs from Innes’ in several, relevant aspects.
First, a real investment decision replaces an ‘effort’ choice. This implies that, in our context,
an agent decision is subject to budget-feasibility, while in Innes’ it is not, as actions only
produce a subjective welfare cost. Second, in line with this interpretation, we assume that
agents can divert outside funds from productive investment and hide them outside their
firms. Third, to represent the idea that it is difficult to distinguish the financial situation
of the firm from the one of its owner-manager, we assume that firms’ capital (net-worth)
is unobservable by the intermediaries. Thus, even if (as in Innes’) the realization of a real
investment project is observable, because correctly reported in the profit-loss statement of
the company, the firm’s capital may remain private information. Finally, in the last part
of the paper we extend the model to the case in which the realization of a real investment
project is observable only at a cost, capturing auditing costs.
Given the presence of moral hazard and, possibly, of adverse selection, the space of
contracts we consider is multidimensional, consisting not only of a (final) payment schedule,
as in Innes’, but also of a loan size, of an initial ‘down-payment’, and of an auditing (or
verification) rule. The down-payment can assume different forms, for example, configuring
a participation fee (e.g. in the spirit of franchising), a security deposit (e.g. bank credit
credit lines), a collateral requirement (e.g. in secured credit card and bank credit lines)
and a minimum capital requirement (e.g. a minimum capital requirement prescribed by
corporate law to limited liability companies, corporations, etc.). Alternative forms of this
instrument have various impact on agents’ incentives and decisions. A third contractual
dimension is the loan size that may, possibly, be used to induce a dose of ‘credit rationing,’
when the demand of outside funding exceeds that size.3 Finally, when we consider the case
of costly state verification on final returns on firms’ activities, a forth contractual dimension
is the set of states in which the agent commits to certify profits.
Our main result is an optimal menu of contracts with the following characteristics:
1.i) A payment schedule typical of standard debt contracts (SDCs) if either profit real-
izations are subject to costly verification or if they are verifiable at no cost and a
monotonicity condition is imposed;4
1.ii) An initial down-payment that takes the form of a maximal capital participation by
the agent when SDCs are optimal, and of a full collateralization, otherwise;
1.iii) A loan size that induces no credit ‘rationing’ or ‘restriction’ to the agent;
2Innes (1990) uses the reduced-form approach pioneered by Mirrlees (1976) and Ho¨lmstrom (1979).
3Some path-breaking articles on the role of: a) collateral are Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) and Chan & Thakor
(1987); b) security (or bond) deposit is Lewis & Sappington (2000); c) franchise fee is Mathewson & Winter
(1984). Stigliz & Weiss cit. is also a classic of credit rationing.
4SDCs are defined similarly to Gale & Helwig (1985); loosely speaking, as financial contracts whose (final)
payment schedule dictates a fixed (non-contingent) payment z > 0 for high enough, profit realizations and
a ‘default-payment’ or an equity-type payment (realized profits + collateral) otherwise.
2
1.iv) An interest rate schedule that is monotonically decreasing in the firm’s initial capital
and in its debt size, up to the point that financial opportunities sustain the first-best
(i.e. the level of investment that would be optimal in the absence of asymmetric
information). A verification region that is also monotonically decreasing in the same
variables.
Moreover, the optimal menu of contracts supports entrepreneurial policies with the following
characteristics.
2.i) A unique optimal financial structure is derived for each firm; entrepreneurs’ most
preferred source of finance is internal capital, followed by outside debt: if initial
capital is sufficient to fund the first-best level of individual investment, the en-
trepreneur does not demand outside finance; otherwise, he agrees/decides to endow
the firm with the maximal (secured) level of capital and raises outside funding to
finance the desired investment project, whose size is below the first-best (i.e. there
is underinvestment);
2.ii) Entrepreneurs who subscribe a debt contract, use all the available funds to invest
in the firm, implying that investments are sensitive to cash flows and that less
capitalized firms are more exposed to agency costs and underinvestment.
The fact that the optimal menu is composed of SDCs is a robust result in our analysis, in
the sense that it holds for any arbitrarily small verification cost. This essentially strengthen
Innes (1990), who exogenously restricts the space of contracts to one with non-decreasing
payment schedules. The underline idea on the optimality of SDCs in the presence of moral
hazard is by Jensen and Meckling (1976): debt strengthens incentives to invest relative
to equity by redistributing most of the agent’s financial cost from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ states
(‘bankruptcy’ states). However, in our analysis the shape of the payment schedule differs
with respect to the traditional one in the literature, essentially due to the role played
by initial capital, under limited-liability and costly state verification. It turns out that a
fixed payment is optimal also in a portion of the verification region, which are financed
using realized profits and a partial liquidation of secured capital (i.e. down-payment),
and calibrated so as to satisfy limited-liability and the ex-post, incentive compatibility of
the verification rule. We interpret this region as one in which the firm faces a ‘liquidity’
shortage. Instead, for ‘extremely low’ cash-flow realizations, capital is completely liquidated;
something that we interpret as a ‘bankruptcy’ event (e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1985).
Optimal contracts prescribe a full down-payment (in 1.ii). This can essentially be ex-
plained based on two considerations. First, the down-payment, either in the form of collat-
eral or of capital participation, allows to mitigate moral hazard by increasing the power of
the incentive scheme. In fact, in order to avoid the payment loss, occurring at low profit re-
alizations, each agent tends to increase real investment; this, in turn, allows creditors to offer
a loan contract with a lower interest rate, thereby sustaining incentives. Thus, even if initial
capital were common knowledge, optimal contracts would still prescribe full down-payment.
The incentive effects of capital are consistent with the findings of some contributions in the
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literature on banking and credit markets (e.g, Chan and Thakor, 1987), which however –to
my knowledge- do not approach the problem as a general one of security design.5 They are
also consistent with the literature on financial intermediation and monitoring in which an
increase in initial capital tends to reduce the cost of access to outside finance, by weakening
liquidity-constraints and reducing monitoring cots, for example, in Gale and Hellwig (1985),
and in Ho¨lmstrong and Tirole (1993). In absence of a down-payment, our analysis says that
entrepreneurs with low capitalized firms would claim to have high capital in order to access
to contracts with a lower interest rate and a larger size (by 1.iv).6
The fact that firms with higher net-worth have an easier and cheeper access to credit (in
1.iv), it is also in line with the empirical evidence. Data show that debt contracts of larger
size are typically issued at lower interest rates and have lower default rates; something that
is referred as an evidence that private companies of smaller size, typically, have worse credit
conditions.
Strictly speaking, optimal contracts entail no credit ‘rationing’ (in 1.iii); although, all
firms subscribing a debt contract will underinvest with respect to the first-best (in 2.i).7
The fact that underinvestment is linked to insufficient internal capital and to cash flow is
in line with a consolidated empirical literature, started by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988).8 More recently, this evidence has been reinforced, for example, by Borisova and
Brown (2013, 2015).
The uniqueness of financial decisions in 2.i), unsurprisingly, contrasts with the tradi-
tional neoclassical theory of the firm and invalidates Modigliani-Miller theorem. Moreover,
the implied firm’s financial structure is in line with a modern version of the pecking order
theory: when a firm experiences an imbalance of internal cash-flow and real investment
opportunities, it resorts to external finance raising the debt-to-equity ratio. In other words,
rather than having in mind a static optimal debt-equity ratio, everything else equal, our
entrepreneurs adjust their financial structure to the initial net-worth position and invest-
ment opportunities.9 In this paper, debt is preferred to equity (i.e. to issue a participation
to the firm’s profits) as debt produces a more powerful incentive scheme, supporting higher
5For example, in Chan & Thakor. cit. the mechanism design problem restricts the space of contracts to that
of bank loans. Moreover, they assume that agents/borrowers have unlimited collateral that can be used to
finance an investment of exogenously fixed amount.
6This view is not consistent with some contributions in the same literature, which highlight the adverse
selection effects caused by higher collateral values (see, for example, Stiglitz & Weiss, cit.). However, in
Stiglitz & Weiss cit. collateral is added to contracts designed with respect to the interest rate alone; thus,
again contracts are not defined as a solution of a general mechanism design problem.
7Unlike in this paper, it is sometimes the case in this literature that credit-rationing is identified with
underinvestment (e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1985).
8See also, Hoshi, Kashyap, & Sharfstein (1991), Gertler & Gilchrist (1994).
9Although the goal of this paper is not matching empirical facts, the implied financial structure is coherent
with (at least) part of the empirical evidence; see, for example, Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and, more
recently, Borisova & Brown (2013, 2015). For an opposite view, see for example Frank & Goyal (2003) .
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investments and firm’s expected profits.10 Thus, although entrepreneurs would rather fi-
nance investments through internal funds, a contract based on a combination of a SDC
and a minimum capital requirement can reproduce an efficient equity-based compensation
scheme; a scheme that reduces agency costs and boosts firm investments (in 2.ii).
Related literature on optimal security design. To our knowledge, the only paper that
has investigated a two-period, security-design problem which has paired moral hazard with
asymmetric information on agents’ initial capital, is Lewis and Sappington (2000).11 Yet,
their focus and model differ substantially from ours. First, the problem they analyze is one
of optimal delegation in which a principal, the owner of a project, sicks to select one or
more agents for its implementation; agents’ effort and initial wealth are unobservable to the
principal. Our problem, instead, is one in which a regulator (principal) designs financial con-
tracts that maximize the surplus generated by entrepreneurs (agents) investments subject to
the participation of a financier (principal) conditional to the specified information asymme-
tries.12 This distinction is not purely semantic: the introduction of incentive-compatibility
constraints makes the underline optimal design problems non-concave; hence, the solution
attained from its primal and dual formulations may not just consist in a different sharing
rule of social surplus. Second, the model considered in Lewis and Sappington is binomial;
a project either success or fail. This restriction, in our perspective, severely limits the
possibility to distinguish between a SDC and more complex forms of non-linear financial
agreements. Third, the space of contracts we consider encompasses the one in Lewis and
Sappington’s. We argue later that the type of down-payments they consider (the ‘up front
bond’ payment in their language) is feasible for our designer but not optimal. This is again
due to the fact that the possibility of capital confiscation has the effect of increasing the
incentive to invest in the firm (i.e. impairing moral hazard), instead of just working as a
screening (or signaling) device; something that, again, is in line with the literature on bank-
ing and credit markets under asymmetric information (see, for example, Chan and Thakor,
1987). Finally, our analysis extends to the case of costly state verification on the outcomes
of the agent’s activity; something that is more in line with the idea of an ‘opacity’ on the
financial status of the firm.
A few other contributions study two-period models of optimal financial contracts and
firm investments in the presence of a two-dimensional moral hazard. In the spirit of Jensen
and Meckling (1976), Biasis and Casamatta (1999) and Hellwig (2009) consider the case
in which entrepreneurs must exert costly unobservable effort to improve the distribution
of cash flows (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance), and they must abstain to
choose projects which are too risky (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) to
10In more traditional models of pecking order theory (e.g., Myers & Majluf, 1984), equity is the most disfavor
mean of outside finance because it produces the worst form of adverse selection.
11See also Lewis & Sappington (2001) and the references therein.
12Apart from Innes (1990), our formulation is common to many other contributions in the literature on
optimal security design (see, for example, problem (2) in Gale & Hellwig, 1985). It is mostly natural under
perfect competition on financial markets.
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avoid a fall of expected revenues. The prevalence of risk-shifting justifies contracts that have
an equity component; while, a debt contract is optimal when costly effort prevails. Povel
and Raith (2004), do also consider a contracting problem in which firms revenues depend on
an unobservable decision of the entrepreneur, but it focuses on costly revenues verification.
This setup is closer to ours, but differs in two relevant aspects. First, unlike ours, it does
not consider that agents might have unobservable initial capital; which might affect firm’s
revenues in a way that goes beyond a scale effect. Second, as for the other two latest
contributions, the security design problem follows the state-space approach, and studies
optimal contracting by separately analyzing different entrepreneurial choices, concerning
the investment scale (a continuous variable) and either effort or project riskiness (binary
variables). Our analysis, instead, follows the reduced-form approach and replaces a binary
‘effort’ choice with an continuous investment choice.13 The implied decision model is one
in which investment, unlike effort, is restricted by a budget constraint and is sensitive
to both internal and external financing opportunities. Moreover, as for R&D expenditure,
investments affect the distribution of the revenues of an innovation project.14 In this respect,
our model is close, in spirit, to the benchmark of neoclassical growth models of R&D and
innovation;15 a benchmark that seams to fit better certain technologies used for SMEs
intensely involved in R&D.
Organization. The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and some pre-
liminary results. Section 3 defines the optimal mechanism-design problem and states our
first, main result, theorem 1, referring to the case in which firms’ profits are observable and
verifiable. The case of costly state verification of profits is analyzed in section 4, where
theorem 2 is established. Most proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Basic structure and preliminary results
The model is one with a single consumption good, two time periods, date 0 and 1, and
uncertainty over the second period. Agents are risk neutral entrepreneurs and intermedi-
aries. Each entrepreneur is the single-owner of a firm and his type is determined by the
firm’s first period, endowment of capital (net-worth) a in A := [a, a¯]. Initial net-worth is the
consequence of an unrepresented past and may reflect the return of the entrepreneur’s past
production and financial decisions, as well as personal wealth injected by the entrepreneur
into the firm.
13The reduced-form approach was pioneered by Mirrlees (1974), Ho¨lmstrom (1979) and followed by Innes
(1990), among others.
14In this paper as well as in Povel and Raith (2004), the main results are established under the assumption
that, respectively, investments and effort are such that distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property, in the sense of Milgrom (1981). This is know to imply first-order stochastic dominance.
15See, for example, the simple representation in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), and the more elaborated
models of Shumpeterian growth started by Aghion and Howitt (1992, 2005); see also Aghion, Dewatripont,
& Rey (1999).
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In date 0, all agents are uncertain on the outcome of each firm’s production activity,
which is represented by the realization of a production project yielding (gross) profits pi
in Π := [0,∞) in date 1. Although, profit opportunities Π are equal across firms, their
likelihood depends on each entrepreneur’s investment choice, x ≥ 0. We, respectively, let
g(pi|x) and G(pi|x) denote the (conditional) density and the distribution functions of profits
when the investment is x. g and G are assumed to be common knowledge.16
The representation of the state space Π can also be used to identify specific ‘innovation
states,’ for example, referred to a technological improvement or to an improvement in the
firm’s organization. We define an innovation state pis, as the threshold-profit such that an
increase of x raises the probability of each and every pi ≥ pis and reduces that of all pi < pis.
According to this definition, 1 − G(pis|x) measures the probability that an entrepreneur,
investing x, successfully innovates.17
Throughout the paper, the following assumptions will be maintained, unless differently
specified.
Assumption 1. The distributions g and G satisfy the following properties.
(1) g(pi|x) and G(pi|x) are twice continuously differentiable functions of x.
(2) Innovation requires investment, G(pis|0) = 1;
(3) Entrepreneur’s investment increases the likelihood of higher profits; for all x,
∂
∂pi
(
gx(pi|x)
g(pi|x)
)
is positive on Π and strictly positive for almost all (a.a.) pi ≥ pis;
Property (3) is a monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLR) (Milgrom, 1981) and implies
that the class of distributions considered satisfies first-order stochastic dominance over firms’
outcomes. By (3), investment increase the likelihood of innovation, Gx(pi|x) ≤ 0, for all
pi > 0 (holding with strict inequality at a.a. pi ≤ pis).
An additional, technical assumption is the convexity of the distribution function:
Assumption 2. For all (x, z) > 0,
∫∞
z g(pi|x)dpi = 1−G(z|x) is strictly convex in x.
This assumption prescribes a form of stochastic diminishing return to scale in investment,
Gxx(z|x) ≤ 0 for all (x, z) > 0. It is common in the moral hazard literature, as it makes
possible to exploit the ‘first-order approach’ (see Rogerson, 1985). Conditional distributions
16This modeling choice of profits is the reduced-form, due to Mirrlees (1974) (see also Ho¨lmstrom, 1979)
and it has proved to give simpler characterizations of the optimum than those found using the state-space
approach. The state-space approach would write firm’s profit as the outcome of investment/effort x and a
random variable θ˜, say, pi = θ˜f(x). Given a distribution of θ˜, one can deduce the distribution of pi, using
the relationship pi = θ˜f(x). Though, the reverse relationship –from the reduced-form to the state-space
approach- is not always true. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the distribution functions to achieve
the equivalence of the two approaches have been, recently, established in Poblete & Spulberg (2012).
17The identification of one, or more, of such innovation-states is only for expositional reasons and can be
removed without altering any of our results.
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satisfying the two assumptions and, particularly, MLR and convexity, can be found in the
class of bivariate exponential, often used in applications.18
Financial contracts and intermediaries. Contracts are exchanged in date 0, before
entrepreneurs implement their investment decisions. Outside investors are risk neutral
intermediaries who participate to contracts provided they do not expect to make losses. We
shall make precise that contracts are written contingent to the information that is verifiable.
In our context, this consists in profit realizations, for which verification may occur at a cost,
and in the level of the firm’s initial capital, when this is ‘secured’ or certified.
A financial contract l in L is characterized by a tuple, (Bl,P l, αl,Πvl ), where: Bl ≥ 0
is the amount of funds (or loan size); αl is the fraction of the up-front payment (or down-
payment) of capital required to an agent to enter the contract; P l is the payment schedule, a
function of the firm’s verifiable net-worth, depending on the firm’s (verifiable) profits pi and
the down-payment αlal; if profits are verifiable at a cost, Π
v
l ⊂ Π denotes the verification
region.
Up-front payments are secured in a bank deposit, which pays a fixed interest rate R;
moreover, unless some form of terminal confiscation is prescribed by the contract, they
remain a firm’s property. Payments are restricted so that P l satisfies two properties: (a)
it is piecewise smooth and right differentiable on Π; (b) it satisfies limited liability, for all pi
in Π and l in L,
(LL) 0 ≤ P l ≤ pi + αlalR
The upper bound in (LL) is often motivated by legal provisions, or by the ability of the
entrepreneurs (especially in small business) to hide funds and other sources of income.
Accordingly, capital confiscation may occur either unconditionally or conditionally to some
future states. In the first case, we have contracts such as those prescribing a participation (or
franchise) fee; in the second case we have collateralized loans, for which confiscation occurs,
for example, in ‘bankruptcy states’ (states with ‘particularly’ low profit realizations). The
lower-bound, 0 ≤ P l establishes that creditors’ liability is limited by the loan offered to the
firm (i.e. in the worse possible scenario, a creditor looses the amount of the loan). This
excludes contracts in which the financier buys equity rights from the entrepreneur, which
she may eventually waive, transfer back or loose.19
Intermediaries raise funds by collecting deposits at the riskless rate R > 0 and their
participation condition is: for all contracts l in L, and investment x > 0,
(IP)
∫
P lg(pi|x)dpi −RBl ≥ 0
18For example, 1−G(z|x) = a(bcx+ 1) exp[−za(bcx+ 1)], (a, b, c) > 0, z > 0, known as Arnold & Strauss
(1988) model.
19An equity contract of this type and size κl imposes a LL on the side of the financier, −κl ≤ minpi P l.
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Entrepreneurs. For every contract l, a project of an entrepreneur of type a, is characterized
by a pair of financial and real investments (a′, x) which solves,
max
(a′,x)∈R2+
E[V (a′, x;pi, l, a)|x] :=(F(l, a))
=
{∫
[pi − P l]g(pi|x)dpi + αlaR+Ra′ : a′ + x ≤ Bl + (1− αl)a
}
We shall denote the project of an entrepreneur a, associated to contract l,
a′(l, a), x(l, a)
Implicit in this formulation is that firms cannot monitor other firms and that putting
money into a safe deposit is the only feasible financial investment. Also, in line with the
finance literature, we interpret the entrepreneur’s decision to set a′ = 0 as one in which he
commits to maximal equity financing of a risky investment x.
Some additional definitions and preliminary results. We say that a financial contract
l in L is a standard debt contract (SDC), in the sense of Gale & Hellwig (1985), if there
exists a state zl in Π such that, for all pi > zl, some constant payment zl is required;
while, for all states pi ≤ zl, a ‘maximum payment’ is required to the firm; here, by (LL), the
latest is bounded above by the verifiable net-worth (i.e. initial down-payment and verifiable
realized profits). When pi ≤ zl and the payment prescribes a full appropriation of the firm’s
net-worth, we have the equivalent of what are usually called ‘bankruptcy states.’ Instead,
a financial contract l in L is a live-or-die (LDC) in the sense of Innes (1990), if it is like a
SDC except that the prescribed payment at all pi > zl is equal to zero.
Moreover, we say that a financial contract l in L is monotone (M) if the payment schedule
is non-decreasing. Monotonicity has been explained as a way to prevent situations in which
profits are strategically ‘manipulated’. For example, if payments violate (M) as in a LDC,
an agent who can ex-post access to (hidden) borrowing can fictitiously increase profits so
as to escape bankruptcy and the consequent loss of collateral; this, of course, is easier
to accomplish if profits are unverifiable.20 We shall argue below that monotonicity is a
robust property in theory, in the sense that it is obtained endogenously in a large class of
mechanisms (see our section 4).
Lemma 1 (Investment). Assume that G is a continuous distribution. Then, for every
entrepreneur of type a in A, contract l in L and investment x, such that (IP) holds, a
solution to F(l, a) exists. Moreover, under assumption 2, the solution is unique if contracts
are either SDCs or LDCs.
Proof. The first part is the result of the objective function being continuous and bounded
on a compact domain of the choice variables. By (IP ) and (LL), RBl ≤ E[P l|x] ≤ E[pi|x] <
20See, also the discussion in Innes (1990), p.50.
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∞.21 Individual budget constraint implies that 0 ≤ a′ ≤ a+B − x ≤ a+B <∞. Thus,
E[V (a′, x;pi, t, l)|x] ≤ E[pi|x] +Ra′ <∞
Hence, by continuity, the objective is bounded from above. It is also bounded from below
by the return from inaction, Ra. Therefore, existence of a solution follows from Weierstrass
Theorem. Uniqueness holds for both SDCs and LDCs under assumption 2 and LL. 
Under assumption 1(1) and 2 we can characterize a project (a′, x) in (a′(l, a), x(l, a)),
as the pair of continuous functions that satisfy the following condition: whenever a′ =
Bl + (1− αl)a− x > 0,
∂
∂x
E[V (a′, x;pi, l, a)|x)] = 0(x)
Let E [V (a′, x;pi,R, a)|x)] denote the expected profits of a typical entrepreneur who can
save at the risk-free rate R. As we argue later, this contract is the optimal one in the absence
of information asymmetries, hence it is hereafter addressed as the first-best contract (labeled
as, l = R). The following lemma defines the first-best level of investment.
Lemma 2 (Investment efficiency). Under assumption 1(1) and 2, for all a in A, there
exists a unique efficient (first-best) investment xo,
∂
∂x
E
[
V (a′, x;pi,R, a)|x)]
x=xo
= 0
Finally, to focus on situations in which outside financing is demanded by a non-negligible
portion of entrepreneurs, we assume that a ‘large’ fraction of them would not be able to
implement their projects without borrowing (i.e. choosing to subscribe the null contract
l = 0). This is summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 3. There is an open interval A′ of A such that, for all a in A′, at a solution
(a′, x) to F(0, a),
∂
∂x
E
[
V (a′, x;pi, l, a)|x)]
l=0
> 0
Throughout the rest of the paper we shall redefine the type space A as equal to A′.
3. Optimal financial contracts when profit realizations are observable
Suppose that profit realizations are observable and verifiable; thus, we simplify L by
dropping the verification region Πv. We define and characterize optimal contracts and
analyze entrepreneurial policy decisions, assuming that: i) before contracting, each agent
type sends a message concerning his type a and project (a′, x); ii) once a contract l is signed,
each agent chooses the project to implement; iii) profit realizations are publicly observed
after projects have been finalized.
Contracts and entrepreneurial policies are defined based on a revelation mechanism, which
establishes a sharing-rule over the firm’s net-worth.
21Hereafter, expectations are all computed with respect to the densities g.
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Definition 1 (Mechanism M). A mechanism in M is:
i) a set of messages M ⊂ A × R2+, of typical element m = (a, a′, x), that each en-
trepreneur can send to the principal,
ii) a profile of outcome functions M → L×R2+ whose values identify a feasible contract
l(m) in L and an actual implementation of the the project, (a′(m), x(m)); where a
contract l(m) in L identifies a triplet (Bl(m),P l(m), αl(m)) defined above.
M is a direct-mechanism if for each type a˜ in A, the message sent is truthful, m ≡
(a˜, a˜′, x˜), l(m) ≡ a˜ and the announced project is implemented, (a′(m), x(m)) ≡ (a′(a˜), x(a˜)).
A solution to our security design problem is the outcome of an optimal, direct mechanism,
defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Optimal mechanism). An optimal mechanism is a direct-mechanism in
M such that, for every entrepreneur of type a, each value of the outcome functions (l, a′, x)
solves problem P:
max
{l¯,(a¯′,x¯)}∈(L,R2+)
E[V (a¯′, x¯;pi, l¯, a)|x] s.t.
(a′, x) ∈ arg max
{a¯′,x¯}
E[V (a¯′, x¯;pi, a, l¯)|x¯](CC)
l ∈ arg max
{l¯}
E[V (a¯′, x¯;pi, a, l¯)|x¯](IC)
E[P l|x]−RBl ≥ 0(IP)
(CC) and (IC), respectively, denote a commitment and an incentive-compatibility con-
straint. The first ensures that the agent does not deviate from the announced project
(a′, x); the second, that the agent spontaneously subscribes the contract designed for his
type.
Observe that, as an outcome of the optimal mechanism, we determine both the optimal
menu of contracts offered to all entrepreneurs and the corresponding optimal entrepreneurial
policy.22
Theorem 1. Let assumptions 1 through 3 hold. The menu of optimal contracts in L and
optimal entrepreneurial policies is the outcome of a direct mechanism in M such that, for
all a in A,
(1) entrepreneur a subscribes a financial contract l (≡ a) that takes one of the following
two forms, depending on whether or not monotonicity of the payment schedule is
assumed:
22Restricting to direct mechanism is without loss of generality and follows from a standard application of
the Revelation Principle.
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(i) If monotonicity (M) is assumed, it takes the form of a SDC with payment
schedule,
(P ∗) Pa(pi) =
{
za, for all pi > za − aR,
pi + aR, otherwise,
for some za > aR, it requires maximal capital participation of the agent (αaa =
a) if (CC) binds and no need of capital participation otherwise; or,
(ii) If (M) is not assumed, contracts have the form of LDCs with ‘full collateral’ if
(CC) binds and no need of a collateral otherwise;
(2) the contract brakes even (i.e. (IP) holds with equality);
(3) entrepreneur a chooses an inefficient investment project, 0 < x(a) < xo, whenever
(CC) binds;
(4) entrepreneur a does not resort to hidden saving (a′(l, a) = 0).
(5) the optimal menu of contracts is characterized by an investment schedule x(a) and
an interest rate schedule za/Ba which are respectively monotonically increasing and
decreasing for almost all a in {A : x(a) < xo} and are constant otherwise.
For a clearer understanding of the effects produced by different sources of information
asymmetries it is useful to, first, deal with the case in which types are common knowledge
(i.e. the case of ‘pure moral hazard’) and then to introduce asymmetric information on
entrepreneurs’ types in A. This will be, respectively, done in the next two subsections in
which proposition 1 and 2 will be established. The proof of theorem 1 follows directly from
these propositions.
3.1. Pure moral hazard. When a type a is verifiable at no cost, before contracting, the
message space M is reduced to projects (a′, x) and P is redefined by dropping (IC). For
notational simplicity, in the rest of this section, we shall omit indices of contracts and agent
types, (l, a).
Proposition 1. The menu of optimal contracts in L and optimal entrepreneurial policies
is such that, for each entrepreneur a, properties (1)-(5) in the theorem hold.
Proof of proposition 1: see the Appendix
The case of pure moral hazard is the closest to Innes (1990). As in that article, the mech-
anism is linear in the payment function, something that explains why a solution takes either
the form of a SDC or of a LDC, depending on whether or not one assumes monotonicity (M).
What is new with respect to Innes’ is the presence of initial capital and the fact that this
affects the demand of outside funding required to implement the firm’s project (i.e. Innes’
‘effort’ is subject to a budget constraint). The presence of initial capital allows to weaken
the limited-liability constraint on the side of the firm and, correspondingly, to increase the
punishment scheme in bankruptcy states. In other words, similarly to collateral, the firm’s
12
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Figure 1. Contracts with and without down-payment
capitalization reduces moral hazard. What we actually establish in the proposition is that,
thanks to capital, the optimal contract can now be offered at a lower interest rate; this is
clearly illustrated in figure 1, where z decreases with α. In turn, a decrease in the interest
rate boosts expected profits and real investments. We show that the latest effects are such
that the debt size can be adjusted to sustain investments, without violating intermediaries’
participation. This reasoning can be used to argue that there is a unique financial structure
of the firm that is a mix of capital and debt, with (secured) capital being equal to the
maximum wealth available to the entrepreneur in date 0.
A first implication of the introduction of a down-payment is on the definition of the
‘bankruptcy’ region. In Innes cit. and in the rest of the literature, this is identified with
those states pi ≤ z, which do not allow the firm to payback their debt through cash flows.
Here, because of the presence of a down-payment, there is an intermediate region (z′−aR, z],
of ‘liquidity’ shortage, in which the contract keeps prescribing a fixed payment z that the
firm pays integrating its insufficient cash flow with a partial liquidation of secured assets
(its contractual down-payment). Only for ‘extremely low’ states, in [0, z′ − aR], the fim
goes ‘bankrupt’ and suffers a total seizure of secured capital.
An additional implication of the use of capital is that, along the menu of optimal con-
tracts, defined with respect to a in A, the interest rate z/B is monotonically decreasing
and real investment, x, is monotonically increasing up to the first-best scale xo. In other
words, by increasing x, the entrepreneur escapes liquidity problems and bankruptcy, states
in which the firm looses its profits and some of its capital.
The effects of capital we have just highlighted can also be used to explain why, at an
optimal contract, hidden savings a′ is zero; that is, the entrepreneur chooses full internal-
equity participation. Reasoning by contradiction, we argue in the proof that, if at an
optimal SDC, (B, z, α), the entrepreneur had to choose x > 0 and a′ > 0, there would be an
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alternative contract with a higher capital requirement and a lower cost z˜ < z such that, if
subscribed by the agent, it would finance a project characterized by a higher real investment
x˜ > x and a lower saving a˜′ < a; something that would produce a contradiction.
3.2. Private information on firms’ initial capital. So far, we have considered the case
in which the regulator/principal observes entrepreneurs’ initial capital (i.e. their types).
In this section, we relax this assumption and prove that the optimal mechanism delivers
the same menu of contracts, in L; that is, L∗ is a menu of incentive-compatible contracts
(i.e. contracts satisfying (IC) in M). This menu induces all entrepreneurs to truthfully
reveal their types and subscribe the contracts which are designed to support their optimal
projects. For expositional reasons, we assume that financial contracts are exclusive; in the
sense that every entrepreneur can subscribe a single financial contract. Later, in remark
3.1, we explain why –at the optimal menu- entrepreneurs do actually prefer to subscribe a
single contract than to shop for a portfolio of different contracts.
Consider contracts that require the entrepreneur who sends a message a to dispose a
down-payment of a. Clearly, under full down-payment, an entrepreneur of type a˜ can only
send messages with a ≤ a˜, which rules out the possibility that he can access to (hence
deviate to) SDCs designed for higher capitalized firms. Then, the following is true.
Proposition 2. Under private information on types in A, a.a. contracts l in L∗ are
incentive-compatible.
Proof. Incetive-compatibility prescribes that every agent a˜ in A prefers to follow the be-
havior prescribed by the mechanism a˜ ∈ L∗ with an expected payoff ν(â) ≡ ν(a˜, a˜), instead
of taking an alternative mechanism ` 6= a˜ ∈ L∗ and use it to implement an individually
optimal project (a′(`, a˜), x(`, a˜)).23 Since for a type a˜ the only feasible messages are those
with a ≤ a˜, consider these deviations.
First, we show that for all ` ≤ a˜, x(`, a˜) = x(`). Indeed, x(`) is feasible for type a˜ > `,
who can claims to have a firm with capital al < a˜ and implement x(`) = B` < B` + a˜− a`.
This implies that x(`, a˜) ≥ x(`). Next, because types have the same objectives and type
` is not rationed at the optimal contract ` ∈ L∗, x(`) is also individually optimal for a˜,
implying that a′(`, a˜) = a˜− a`; namely, x(`, a˜) ≤ x(`).
Second, recall that for a.a. ` in L∗, a′(`) = 0, x(`) = B`, and (IP) holds with equality on
L∗.
23Later, we use the notation (a′(`), x(`)) := (a′(`, `), x(`, `)).
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Next, we are going to exploit these two last properties of L∗ to verify that such menu of
contracts is incentive-compatible. For all a ≤ a˜ and entrepreneur a˜,
ν(a˜, a˜)− ν(a, a˜) =
∫
[pi − P a˜]g(pi|x)(a˜)dpi +Ra˜−
∫
[pi − P a]g(pi|x)(a, a˜)dpi −R[a+ a′(a, a˜)]
=
∫
[pi − P a˜]g(pi|x)(a˜)dpi +Ra˜−
∫
[pi − P a]g(pi|x)(a)dpi −R[a+ a˜− a]
=
∫
pi[g(pi|x)(a˜)− g(pi|x)(a)]dpi −RBa˜ +RBa
=
∫
pi[g(pi|x)(a˜)− g(pi|x)(a)]dpi −R[x(a˜)− x(a)]
This, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, for all a ≤ a˜, can be written as,∫ a˜
a
[(∫
pigx(pi|x)(`)dpi −R
)
dx
da
(`)
]
d`
For the latest to be positive, it suffices that for all a ≤ ` ≤ a˜, the argument in the square
brackets is positive. Indeed, this is true since, first, by (CC’),∫
pigx(pi|x)(`)dpi −R =
∫
P `(pi)gx(pi|x)(`)dpi ≥ 0
with strict inequality if x(`) < xo; second, by proposition 1 (and particularly, lemma 7 in the
appendix), for all ` ≤ a¯, (dx/da)` ≥ 0, holding with strict inequality for a.a. contracts ` for
which x(`) < xo (occurring for those a with a binding (CC)). Therefore, ν(a˜, a˜)−ν(a, a˜) > 0
if x(`) < xo and is zero otherwise. 
It is interesting to remark that the introduction of private information on the initial
firms’ capital does not alter the original incentive scheme provided by the optimal mech-
anism in the pure moral hazard case (proposition 1). Thus, contracts retain the original
properties and deliver an interest rate schedule, (za/Ba)a∈L∗ , that is decreasing in the ini-
tial firms’ capital a. This, again, proves that higher capitalized firms have better financial
opportunities. Capital participation is used here, both as an optimal incentive devise (pre-
venting moral hazard) and as an efficient screening (or signaling) devise.24 The capital
down payment increases incentives to invest, by relaxing the limited liability, and preserves
incentive-compatibility; something that is achieved by eliminating the possibility that agents
lie on their type, pretend to have higher capital, and access more favorable contracts.
Remark 3.1 (Exclusivity). In the context of our proposition 2, the optimal menu of con-
tracts is such that no entrepreneur has an incentive to subscribe multiple contracts. This
follows immediately from the fact that the interest rate is decreasing in the loan size and in
the capital down-payment. Thus, an entrepreneur with capital a, who needs B to finance
24The optimal mechanism could be equivalently implemented as the outcome of a game in which either
the firms decide on the initial capital contribution or the intermediaries compete in offering contracts that
contain an initial capital requirement.
15
a project, can obtain higher expected profits by choosing a single contract with full down-
payment a, than by a portfolio of loans (each of which is designed for a lower capitalized
firm) of total size B¯ ≥ B and total down-payment a¯ ≤ a.
4. Optimal financial contracts with costly state verification
We now consider the case in which firms’ informational ‘opacity’ also concerns profits.
Assume that monitoring profits is feasible, albeit costly. In the spirit of Townsend (1979),
we assume that in date-1 states pi are verifiable by the firm, paying an ‘auditing cost.’ We
assume that, for all contracts l in L, this cost is a constant fraction λ of the payment due Pl.
We redefine contracts by adding to (B,P, α)l a verification region Π
v
l in Π. The verification
region is part of the contract; determined in date-0, it indicates the states in which a firm
is supposed to pay to be audit.
Consequently, the definition of the mechanism is modified in two elements. First, the
message space includes date-1 messages on whether or not the firm is in a verification state
(according to the contract). Second, the definition of the outcome function is adapted such
that feasibility also requires a consistence (or commitment) condition, which ensures that
date-1 messages are truthful: the entrepreneur, upon observing any pi in Πvl , will proceed
to the firm auditing; and will otherwise not audit, for states pi in Πol = Π \Πvl .
As in Townsend (1979) (see his lemma 2.1), for some constant cl > 0, consistence is
achieved if and only if payment schedules satisfy the following two restrictions; namely:
(i) for all pi in Πol ≡ Π \Πvl , Pl(pi) = cl;(c)
(ii) for all pi in Πvl , Pl(pi)(1 + λ) ≤ cl.
These conditions are intuitively clear. If the agent is in a non-verification state he can
always claim the lowest possible level of profit in Πol , hence this level will actually pin down
the consistent interest rate in this region. In contrast, if pi is in the verification region
Πvl , he will actually proceed to pay the verification cost if this will lead to a payment cost
(1 + λ)Pl(pi) that does not exceed cl, the total payment due under no verification.
For completeness, we provide a formal definition of the mechanism.
Definition 3 (Mechanism M′). A mechanism in M′ is:
i) a set of date-0 messages M0 ⊂ A × R2+, of typical element m0 = (a, a′, x), and
date-1 messages m1 in M1 ⊂ Π, which an entrepreneur can send to the principal,
M ≡M0 ×M1, m ≡ (m0,m1) ∈M ;
ii) a profile of outcome functions M → L×R2+ whose values identify a feasible contract
l(m) in L and an actual implementation of the the project, (a′(m), x(m)); where
a contract l(m) in L identifies a tuple (Bl(m),P l(m), αl(m), cl(m)) and a verification
region Πvl(m).
A solution to our security design problem is the outcome of an optimal, direct mechanism:
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Definition 4 (Optimal mechanism). For all 0 ≤ λ < 1, an optimal mechanism is a
direct-mechanism in M′ such that, for every entrepreneur of type a in A, each value of the
outcome functions solves problem P ′: (a′, x,B,P , B, α, c) and the region Πo (Πv ≡ Π−Πo),
maximize, ∫
Πo
[pi − c]g(pi|x)dpi
∫
Πv
[pi − P (pi)(1 + λ)]g(pi|x)dpi +Ra′
subject to,
0 ≤ a′ = B − x+ (1− α)a, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ B,∫
Πo
[pi − c]gx(pi|x)dpi +
∫
Πv
[pi − P (pi)(1 + λ)]gx(pi|x)dpi −R = 0(CC’)
c
∫
Πo
g(pi|x)dpi +
∫
Πv
P (pi)g(pi|x)dpi −RB ≥ 0(IP’)
Pl(pi) = cl, for all pi in Π
o
l ≡ Π \Πvl(c)
Pl(pi)(1 + λ) ≤ cl, otherwise
0 ≤ (1 + λ)P (pi) ≤ pi + αaR, for all pi in Πv(LLv)
0 ≤ P (pi) ≤ pi + αaR, otherwise.(LLo)
Under costly state verification the outcome of a direct, optimal menu is characterized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let assumptions 1 through 3 hold. In the presence of costly state verification
on date-1 profits, the menu of optimal contracts takes the form of a SDC with a payment
schedule,
Pa(pi) =

za, for all pi ∈ Πoa;
za
1+λ , for all pi ∈ ΠvHa ≡ {pi′ ∈ Πva : pi′ ∈ [za − aR, za]};
pi+aR
1+λ , for all pi ∈ Πva \ΠvHa .
where, Πva = [0, za], Π
o
a = Π \ Πva. All the other properties of the contracts are identical to
those numbered (2) through (5) in theorem 1.
Proof of theorem 2: see the Appendix
Observe that the payment schedule, and the whole result in this theorem coincides with
theorem 1, if we let the verification cost λ go to zero and we introduce monotonicity of
the payment schedule (M). This can be easily explained observing the similarity of the
constraint (M) with the consistence requirement (c). Indeed, consistence imposes a ‘mono-
tonicity’ of the payment schedule, (1 + λ)Pa(pi) ≤ Pa(za), for all states pi in Πva. A mono-
tonicity restriction is not implied by (c) in the verification region, in which the asymmetric
information on realized profits vanishes. Yet, optimality prescribes the maximal feasible
punishment in such region, yielding monotonicity of the optimal payment schedule in Πva
too. Therefore, after taking into account the verification costs, so as to avoid a failure of
consistence/monotonicity, the optimal payment schedule in the two theorems are the same:
17
defining Pλ as the payment inclusive of the auditing cost, when payed, one obtains a graph
of the payment schedule identical to the one in figure 1 above.
Next observe that, since theorem 2 holds for all λ > 0, we can use this result to claim that
SDCs with a monotone payment schedule are the only robust, optimal menu one should
really focus on and that, even theoretically, LDCs can be thought as atypical.
5. Conclusions
This article studies a security design problem in which outside investors are unable to ob-
serve entrepreneurs’ investments decisions and their firms’ net-worth, both before and after
contracts are signed. The interconnectedness of these three different forms of asymmetric
information implies as many risks in the design problem: a possible adverse selection on
entrepreneurs’ types (initial capital) and moral hazards, both on investments and on the
release of final information regarding firm’s income/profits. Since investments are unob-
servable and the exact consistency of firms’ net-worth is unverifiable, contracts can only be
written contingently on future verified profits and on an initial down-payment, in the form
of secured capital.
Our approach to the problem builds on the classical, reduced-form one used in the moral
hazard literature. Investment decisions, similarly to effort, affect the firms success probabil-
ity, increasing the likelihood of higher returns from production. However, differently from
effort and similarly to R&D expenditure, investment size is budget constraint; it depends on
both the amount of the entrepreneur’s initial capital (past firm’s cash flow) and the firm’s
access to outside funds.
The results we present establish that outside finance should take the form of a debt
contract, whose terms are: a firm’s capital requirement, a fund size, an interest rate, a
verification rule. Optimal contracts form a menu. Contracts with higher capital prescrip-
tions offer more funds at a lower interest rate and have a smaller verification region. State
verification occurs when profit realizations are ‘low’ and it is accompanied by a gradual
confiscation of capital; a seizure of the entire capital occurs only when profits drop below
a ‘bankruptcy’ threshold. At optimal contracts, firms privilege internal to external funds.
In particular, only entrepreneurs who have insufficient capital decide to borrow. These
entrepreneurs are exactly those who underinvest in their firm. Their credit conditions are
tighter the lower is their size (capital), the higher is their desired leverage. These properties
of optimal contracts are robust to the introduction of private information on entrepreneurs
initial net-worth. The presence of down-payments grants incentive-compatibility, by pre-
venting agents to lie on their capital and subscribe contracts designed for higher capitalized
firms. Finally, our findings hold regardless contracts are assumed to be exclusive. The fact
that the interest rate schedule is decreasing in the down-payment, represents a disincentive
to contracting with multiple intermediaries.
We have motivated our interest in this security-design problem also referring to the
‘opacity’ that typically characterizes the financial situation and decisions of small firms,
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representing a particularly large fraction of the non-financial sector, in most developed
countries. These firms heavily rely on bank credit. They raise outside funds in the form of
standard credit lines, provided by a single or very few banks. The interest rate conditions
on credit lines are typically decreasing in the loan size, which is highly positively correlated
with firms’ dimension (in general, capital); that is, highly capitalized firms are less leveraged
and borrow at a lower interest rate. The strong dependency of SMEs to the banking sector
and to traditional forms of credit lines, has often be considered a major cause of inefficiency
and underinvestment. Instead, to some extent, our analysis, along with other results in the
literature on optimal financial contracts, question this conclusion. A proper combination of
standard debt contracts and collateral or minimum capital requirement may constitute an
efficient (in sense of second-best) corporate finance, particularly, in a context in which R&D
type of investments are the engine of high productivity and production revenues. It is so, in
the presence of this predominant form of moral hazard, essentially because debt-contracts
provide entrepreneurs with a reward scheme that is equivalent to the best equity-base one,
compatible with incentives. This is confirmed also in the presence of adverse selection, due
to the positive effect of down-payments in separating firms types, by their different levels
of initial capital. Finally, it extends to situations in which the outcome of firm activities
is verifiable only at a cost. In particular, this latter aspect highlights the fact that, even
if the weak information requirements adopted by regulators are undisputed, a minimum
dose of auditing may have two positive effects. First, it can efficiently prevent firms from
hiding profits from their (tax and non-tax) creditors. Second, it may provide an incentive
to strengthen firms’ capital; something that it has often proved to be essential to survive
negative shocks, both of cyclical and idiosyncratic nature.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We denote by L∗ the menu of optimal contracts.
To prove this result, consider the Lagrangian of problem P, in which (M) is dropped,
budget-balance is used to eliminate a′ and (CC) is substituted with,
(CC’)
∂
∂x
E[V |x] ≡
∫
[pi − P ]gx(pi|x)dpi −R ≥ 0
Also, restrict to no hidden-borrowing, assume a′ ≥ 0, and denote the candidate multipliers
by (ψ, γ, µ, η, θ, ξ, ζ),
max
x,P,B,α
∫
[pi − P ]g(pi|x)dpi + αaR+ (1 + ψ)R [(1− α)a+B − x] + γ
[∫
P g(pi|x)dpi −RB
]
+
+ µ
[∫
[pi − P ]gx(pi|x)dpi −R
]
+
∫
η(pi)[pi + αaR− P ]g(pi|x)dpi+
+
∫
θ(pi)P g(pi|x)dpi + ξBR+ ζ0αaR+ ζ1(1− α)aR
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Necessary conditions for optimality are:
x :
∂
∂x
E[V |x] + γ
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi + µ ∂
2
∂x2
E[V |x]− ψR+(f1)
+
∫
η(pi)[pi + αaR− P ]gx(pi|x)dpi +
∫
θ(pi)P gx(pi|x)dpi = 0,
ψ : ψ ≥ 0, ψ [(1− α)a+B − x] = 0
P : g(pi|x)
{
−1 + γ − µgx(pi|x)
g(pi|x) − [η(pi)− θ(pi)]
}
= 0,(f2)
η, θ : η(pi) ≥ 0, η(pi)[pi + αaR− P (pi)] = 0, θ(pi) ≥ 0, θ(pi)P (pi) = 0, for all pi
B, ξ : 1 + ψ − γ + ξ = 0, ξ ≥ 0, ξB = 0(f3)
α, ζ : 1− (1 + ψ) +
∫
η(pi)g(pi|x)dpi = ζ1 − ζ0, ζ0, ζ1 ≥ 0, ζ0α = 0, ζ1(1− α) = 0.(f4)
Like in Innes (1990), risk-neutrality implies that the problem is linear in P . Let
ϕ(pi, x, ·) := −1 +γ−µgx(pi|x)g(pi|x) ; then, for any given α, the optimal payment schedule satisfies
the following,
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = −θ(pi) < 0 only if Pλ = 0, η(pi) = 0,
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = 0 only if Pλ ∈ [0, pi + αaR}], η(pi) = 0 = θ(pi)
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = η(pi) > 0 only if Pλ = pi + αaR, θ(pi) = 0
The proof of proposition 1 follows from the application of lemma 3 trough 8 below.
Lemma 3. In the context of theorem 1, for any non-trivial contract in L∗ with a non-binding
commitment constraint (CC’), properties (1)-(3) in the theorem hold, with the investment
level equal to xo. a′ ≥ 0 is non-binding.
Proof. We aim at showing that, at a solution, µ = 0 implies γ > 0 (precisely, γ = 1)
and ψ = 0. First, since a first-best entails a non-contingent payment R, we claim that,
w.l.o.g., B = x− a > 0 and α = 0. This, by complementary slackness, implies ξ = 0. (f3)
implies γ ≥ 1 + ψ ≥ 1. Next, we show that γ ≤ 1. By contradiction, suppose γ > 1, then
P (pi) = pi + αaR binding at all pi occurring with positive probability; otherwise, η(pi) = 0
would imply ϕ(pi, x, ·) = −1 + γ + θ(pi) > 0, contradicting (f2). However, P (pi) = pi + αaR
at all pi occurring with positive probability violates (CC’). Indeed, if it were true, we would
have ∂∂xE[V |x] = −R < 0. Therefore, we conclude that µ = 0 implies γ = 1.
By complementary slackness, γ = 1 > 0 implies that (IP) holds with equality.
ψ = µ = 0 and γ = 1 in (f1) imply that,
0 =
∂
∂x
E[V |x] +
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi =
∫
pigx(pi|x)dpi −R
where the rhs is zero at x = xo. Then, (CC) holds by Assumption 3.
Clearly, in this case, there is some indeterminacy of the mechanism: a mechanism with
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payment R, size B = xo−a, α = 0 and a′ = 0 is equivalent to one with -same uncontingent
payment- loan size B′ = a′ +B + αa, 0 < α ≤ 1 and a′ 6= 0; where it should be noted that,
at a solution, any value of α is interior: γ = 1 and ξ = 0, by (f3), imply ψ = 0, and (f4)
yields ζ1 = ζ0 = 0.

Lemma 4. In the context of theorem 1, for any non-trivial contract in L∗ with a binding
commitment constraint (CC’), properties (1)-(3) in the theorem hold and a′ ≥ 0 is non-
binding.
Proof. We proceed in steps.
Step 1: A solution satisfies (IP) with equality.
(f3) implies γ = 1 + ψ > 0. By complementary slackness (IP) binds.
Step 2: A solution satisfies (CC’) with equality.
From µ > 0 and complementary slackness, 0 = ∂∂xE[V |x].
Step 3: A solution is a LDC.
µ > 0 and MLR imply that ϕ(pi, x, ·) is decreasing in pi, strictly decreasing for almost all
pi ≥ pis. Moreover ϕ(pi, x, ·) ≥ 0 at some pi occurring with positive probability, otherwise
P = 0 would be chosen violating (IP). Moreover, we know that, generically, a solution
satisfies ϕ(pi, x, ·) > 0 at some pi. Also, (CC’) implies that we cannot have P = pi + αaR
at all pi and thus, at a solution, it must be that ϕ(pi, x, ·) ≤ 0 at some pi. By continuity
and the Intermediate Value Thm., we conclude that there exists a z ≥ pis > 0 such that
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = 0. The fact that z ≥ pis follows from Step 1, γ ≥ 1. Moreover, z is unique by
strict monotonicity of gx/g on [pis,∞). The optimal payment schedule is typical of a LDC,
in the sense of Innes (1990),
P =
{
0, pi > z
pi + αaR otherwise
Step 4: We now show that, because at a solution
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi > 0, the solution is
inefficient, 0 < x < xo, and satisfies (CC) with a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0.
First, because (CC’) binds (µ > 0), 0 = ∂∂xEV [pi|x] is a necessary optimality condition for
the agent at a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0; implying ψ = 0. Moreover,
0 =
∂
∂x
E[V |x](o)
=
∂
∂x
[∫
[pi − P ]g(pi|x)dpi] + αaR+R(B + a(1− α)− x)
]
=
∂
∂x
∫
[pi −Rx]g(pi|x)dpi −
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
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Using, 0 = ∂∂xE[V |x], γ = 1, ψ = 0, (f1) reads,
0 < −µ ∂
2
∂x2
E[V |x] =
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi+
∫
η(pi)[pi+αaR−P ]gx(pi|x)dpi+
∫
θ(pi)P gx(pi|x)dpi
with the latest inequality following from assumption 2 and µ > 0. By complementary
slackness in (f2), the last two terms are zero, yielding
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi > 0. The latest can be
used in (o) to find,
(∗) ∂
∂x
∫
[pi −Rx]g(pi|x)dpi > 0
As (CC’) holds with equality, a solution x satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for
individual optimality (CC), with a non-binding constraint a′ ≥ 0. Finally, by assumption
2,
∫
[pi−R]g(pi|x)dpi is strictly concave in x; hence, (∗) implies x < xo. 0 < x follows from
assumption 3.
Step 5: Full collateralized LDC contracts.
For any non-trivial contract, we have seen that, ξ = 0 = ψ, γ = 1, irrespectively of µ ≥ 0.
Hence, (f4) reduces to,
(f4’)
∫
η(pi)g(pi|x)dpi = ζ1 − ζ0 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows from ν ≥ 0. This implies an optimal prescription: α = 1 if
lhs > 0 (i.e. if η(pi) > 0 at some pi) and α ∈ [0, 1] if lhs = 0. Next, integrating (f2) on Π,∫
[η(pi)− θ(pi)]g(pi|x)dpi = γ − 1 = 0
Since, by (f2), θ(pi) ≥ 0 holds strictly at some pi, occurring with positive probability, we
conclude that a solution of P yields ζ1 > 0 = ζ0 and, by complementary slackness, it delivers
α = 1. 
Lemma 5. In the context of theorem 1, restrict contracts to have a monotone payment
schedule (M). Then, any non-trivial solution to P is a SDC such that properties (1)-(3)
stated in the theorem hold.
Proof. The proof reiterates the ones given for lemma 3 and 4. The only difference is for
the latest lemma, when it comes to the definition of the payment schedule P (·). Obviously,
LCD violates (M) at all pi > z. The best financial contract is therefore one that distribute
the payments so as to impose the lowest possible burden on ‘high’ states, in which the
marginal effect of investment is increasingly larger, and otherwise impose the highest costs
on ‘low’ states, without violating (M) and (LL). This is achieved by letting z be such that
ϕ(z, ·) = 0, as above, and to start confiscating capital at all pi ≤ z, so as to satisfy (M).
To this end, and only for expositional convenience, we momentarily redefine contracts by
adding to the original elements (B,P, α) a confiscation function, φ : Π → [0, 1], which
specifies the fraction of capital that is confiscated in each state pi. Then, (LL) prescribes
P (z) ≤ z+φ(z)αaR. We let φ(z) = 0 such that, in state pi = z the firm makes profit z and
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pays P (z) = z. Next, for all pi < z, we define,
φ(pi) = min
{
1,
z − pi
αaR
}
As the second term in brackets is decreasing in pi, from 0 (when pi = z) to values higher than
1 (when pi ↘ 0, provided that z/αaR > 1), we identify two sub-regions in [0, z]: (z−αaR, z]
in which there is partial confiscation, φ < 1, and [0, z−αaR] of full ‘bankruptcy’, with φ = 1.
Using the definition of φ into P , the optimal payment schedule in (P ∗) is,
(P ∗) P (pi; z) =
{
z, for all pi > z − αaR;
pi + aR, otherwise.
It should now be clear that the confiscation function was just an intuitive, technical devise,
and that we do not need to keep track of it hereafter.

The following establishes property (4) in the theorem.
Lemma 6. In the context of theorem 1, any optimal financial contract l in L∗ entails no
hidden savings.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that an optimal SDC, (B, z), entails a′ > 0. Let us
marginally reduce B and increase x: dx = −dB > 0,  > 0 arbitrarily small. This is
feasible if da′ = dB − dx = dB(1 + ), and if it satisfies (IP ). (IP ) holds if,(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz
dB
+
(∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
)
dx
dB
−R = 0
where, under (M), ∂∂zE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z g(pi|x)dpi > 0.25 Or, equivalently,
dz
dB
=
R+
(∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
)

∂
∂zE[P |x]
(?)
whose rhs, evaluated at an optimal contract, is positive. Next, totally differentiating the
agent’s objective,
dE[V |x] = −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz +
(
∂
∂x
E[V |x]
)
dx+RdB
which, evaluated at the optimal contract (entailing ∂∂xE[V |x] = 0), reduces to,
dE[V |x]
dB
= −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)
dz
dB
+R
25Notice that d
dz
DxE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z
gxdpi > 0, because gx > 0 for a.a. pi ≥ z ≥ pis, by assumption 1.
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Using (?),
dE[V |x]
dB
= −
(
∂
∂z
E[P |x]
)[
R+
(∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
)

∂
∂zE[P |x]
]
+R
= −
(∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
)
 < 0
for any  > 0. It remains to check that (CC’) continues to hold, for at least some  > 0. At
the initial, optimal contract, (CC’) holds if,
−
(
∂
∂z
DxE[P |x]
)
dz +
(
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dx ≥ 0
where, under (M) (i.e. for collateralized SDCs), ∂∂zDxE[P |x] :=
∫∞
z gx(pi|x)dpi. Using this
to determine :
 ≡ − dx
dB
≥
(
∂
∂zDxE[P |x]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dz
dB
By (?), dz/dB > 0 implying that the right hand side of the latter expression is negative,
when evaluated at the initial optimal contract. Therefore, (CC’) holds for all  > 0. To
sum up, a marginal reduction of the loan size, accompanied with a feasible adjustment of
z (decreasing) and x (increasing) improves the agent’s welfare; which provides the desired
contradiction. As the initial contract delivering a′ > 0, was arbitrary, this concludes our
proof. It is straightforward to reiterate the argument for the case of a LDC. 
Lemma 7. The menu of optimal, monotone SDCs is characterized by an investment sched-
ule x(a) and a loan threshold z(a) which are, respectively, monotonically increasing and
decreasing for almost all a in {A : x(a) < xo} and constant otherwise.
Proof. We essentially verify that the Implicit Function Theorem holds and that it delivers
the desired monotonicity properties of (z, x)(a). From (CC’) holding with equality at almost
all (a.a.) a, we find,
(+)
dx
da
(a) =
(
∂
∂z
∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
)
dz
da
(a) = −µ(a)
(
∂
∂z
∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi
)
dz
da
(a)
For any feasible change dz/da, (+) measures the slope of the optimal investment schedule
on A. This is zero in the case of no-moral hazard (i.e. when the commitment constraint is
non-binding, µ(a) = 0), corresponding to efficient investment xo, for all firms, independently
of theirs initial capital. The numerator of (+) is, (
∫∞
z gx(z|x)dpi)(dz/da), evaluated at (a).
This implies that -given the capital requirements- it is individually optimal to increase
real investments for entrepreneurs with higher capitalized firms if and only if they face a
decreasing loan threshold z. Next, we prove that indeed, at any optimal, monotone SDC a,
dz/da < 0.
Recall that (IP) holds with equality at a.a. contracts in L∗. Hence, the total differential
(with respect to a, z, x,B) must be equal to zero almost everywhere (a.e.). Moreover, since
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for a.a. a, the individual budget constraint balances at zero saving, dBda =
dx
da . Hence,
passing to SDCs and using g := g(pi|x(a)), for brevity,
0 =
∂
∂a
(∫
P agdpi
)
da+
∂
∂z
(∫
P agdpi
)
dz +
∂
∂x
(∫
P agdpi
)
dx−RdB
= Rda+
∂
∂z
(∫ z
0
pigdpi + z
∫ ∞
z
gdpi
)
dz +
(∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi −R
)
dx
= R+ [1−G(z|x(a))]dz
da
+
(∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi −R
)
dx
da
Next, using (+) into the latest expression and rearranging terms,
dz
da
(a) =
−R
1−G(z|x(a)) + (∫ P agx(pi|x(a))dpi −R)(∫∞z gx(z|x(a))dpi∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
)
The right hand side of this expression is negative iff the denominator is strictly positive,
which is true at a.a. optimal, monotone SDCs by lemma 8, below. 
Lemma 8. At any monotone SDC a in L∗,
(oo) R−
∫
P agx(pi|x(a))dpi >
[
1−G(z|x(a))∫∞
z gx(z|x(a))dpi
]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x(a)]
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that, at an optimal contract (oo) fails to hold. We are
going to prove that by, proportionally, increasing B and x and lowering z, we can increase
the value of the objective without violating (IP) and the commitment constraint (CC’).
Indeed, let dB = dx > 0 (and da′ = 0), be an arbitrarily small change. Since (IP) holds
with equality at a.a. a in L∗, differentiating and evaluating at the optimal contract, we
find,
(o∗) dz
dx
=
R− ∫ P gx(pi|x)dpi
1−G(z|x)
which is negative when (oo) fails. We now show that our feasible adjustment dz/dx does
not violate incentives. For (CC’) to hold,
−
(
∂
∂z
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi
)
dz +
(
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
)
dx ≥ 0
Yielding,
dz
dx
≤
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]∫∞
z gx(z|x)dpi
< 0
This does not contradict (o∗) iff,
R− ∫ P gx(pi|x)dpi
1−G(z|x) ≤
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]∫∞
z gx(z|x)dpi
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that we can rewrite as,
R−
∫
P gx(pi|x)dpi ≤
[
1−G(z|x)∫∞
z gx(z|x)dpi
]
∂2
∂x2
E[V |x]
This holds because we started out assuming (oo) does not. Finally, it is immediate to check
that an increase of x,B and a decrease of z, raise the value of the objective, delivering the
desired contradiction. 
§§§
Proof of theorem 2. We define and solve an auxiliary, simpler problem P ′′ and show that
its solution can be used to pin down a solution to P ′. To this end, let the payment schedule
including the auditing cost be defined as, Pλ(pi) (equal to (1 + λ)P (pi) for al pi in Π
v).
P ′′ consists in finding (x, c, P,B, α) maximizing,∫
[pi − Pλ]g(pi|x)dpi +Ra′
subject to, 0 ≤ a′ = B − x+ (1− α)a, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ B,
(CC”)
∫
[pi − Pλ]gx(pi|x)dpi −R = 0
(IP”)
∫
Pλ
1 + λ
g(pi|x)dpi −RB ≥ 0
the consistence requirement, at all pi,
(c) Pλ ≤ c
for all pi,
(LL) 0 ≤ Pλ ≤ pi + αaR
First order conditions are computed. Consider the one related to P λ, for the case in which
(CC ′) is binding (i.e. µ > 0).
P λ : g(pi|x)
{
−1 + γ
1 + λ
− µgx(pi|x)
g(pi|x) − [η(pi)− θ(pi)]− δ(pi)
}
= 0,(f2’)
η, θ, δ : η(pi) ≥ 0, η(pi)[pi + αaR− Pλ] = 0, θ(pi) ≥ 0, θ(pi)Pλ = 0,
δ(pi) ≥ 0, δ(pi)[Pλ − c] = 0, for all pi.
Let ϕ(pi, x, ·) := −1 + γ − µgx(pi|x)g(pi|x) ; then, for any given α, and c ≥ αaR, the optimal
payment schedule satisfies the following,
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = −θ(pi) < 0 only if Pλ = 0, η(pi) = δ(pi) = 0,
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = 0 only if Pλ ∈ [0,min{c, pi + αaR}], δ(pi) = η(pi) = 0 = θ(pi)
ϕ(pi, x, ·) = δ(pi) + η(pi) > 0 only if Pλ = min{c, pi + αaR}, θ(pi) = 0
26
As for proposition 1, MLR implies that an optimal payment schedule is one with the lowest
payment at high realization of profits and the highest payment at the lowest realizations.
A solution is one in which c can take any value greater than αaR, only if γ = (1 + λ)−1,
which implies that (IP”) holds with equality. Let c ≡ z be such that ϕ(z, x, ·) = 0. The
existence and uniqueness of such z follows from the same arguments used above.
Next, define the subregions Πv = [0, z] and Πv = Π \ Πo and restrict P (pi) to satisfy
consistence. As in Townsend (1979) (see his lemma 2.1), for z > 0, consistence is achieved
if and only if payment schedules satisfy the following two restrictions in (c) above; namely:
(i) P (pi) = z, for all pi in Πo ≡ Π \Πv;
(ii) P (pi)(1 + λ) ≤ z, otherwise.
Indeed, for all pi ∈ Πo, one can at most impose to the creditor a payment equal to the
lowest level of profit in Πo, z; here, we claim that in the verification region it is optimal
to have no capital confiscation (Πo does not contain bankruptcy states). At pi = z ∈ Πv,
consistence requires that z = P (z)(1 + λ). As we did in the proof of lemma 5, we redefine
contracts by adding to (B,P, α) a confiscation function, φ : Π→ [0, 1]. As before, φ(z) = 0,
so that P (z) = Pλ(z) = z if the firm chooses not to audit. Otherwise, by taking the highest
possible confiscation value,
φ(pi) = min
{
1,
z − pi
αaR
}
Using this definition of φ, we derive the optimal payment schedule,
(P ∗∗) P (pi) =

z, for all pi ∈ Πo;
z
1+λ , for all pi ∈ ΠvH ≡ {pi′ ∈ Πv : pi′ ∈ (z − αaR, z]};
pi+aR
1+λ , for all pi ∈ Πv \ΠvH .
Therefore, for any z and corresponding verification region, this payment schedule imposes
the maximal confiscation of initial capital (satisfying both LL and consistence) in the veri-
fication region.
Next, using the subregions Πv,Πo to rewrite the objective, one obtains the objective of
the original problem P ′ and, substituting a solution of P ′′ into (IP”), one obtains,
z
∫
Πo
g(pi|x)dpi +
∫
Πv
P (pi)g(pi|x)dpi −RB = 0
which is (IP ′). Thus, we can conclude that a solution of P ′′ is also a solution of the original
problem, P ′.
The rest of the proof goes through identically as for theorem 1.

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